The Iran war has now strained Donald Trump's relationships with three of his most useful partners in Europe, and the deterioration is accelerating in ways that will outlast the current conflict. Trump this week publicly attacked Pope Leo XIV, who has repeatedly called for an end to the US-Israel war on Iran, describing the pontiff as "weak on crime." The attack drew criticism from across the American political spectrum, including from Bishop Robert Barron, a member of Trump's own Religious Liberty Commission, who asked the president to apologise. Trump declined.

Giorgia Meloni, until recently the European leader most ideologically aligned with Trump and the only EU head of government invited to his second inauguration, responded by calling his papal attacks "unacceptable." Trump fired back in an interview with Corriere della Sera published April 15, saying he thought she had courage but was wrong, that she does not help with NATO, and describing the alliance itself as a "paper tiger."

Italy has since refused US bombers landing rights at a strategic airbase in Sicily and suspended its defence cooperation agreement with Israel. Meloni had spent more than a year positioning herself as the bridge between Washington and Brussels, absorbing domestic criticism at home to maintain the relationship. That positioning has now collapsed, with no obvious successor willing to take it on.

Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer told parliament last week he was "fed up" with higher energy bills caused by Trump's war and said joining the conflict is not in Britain's national interest. The IMF this week downgraded its global growth forecast to 2.5% for 2026, partly attributing the revision to the Iran conflict, and cut Britain's growth forecast to 0.8%, down from a previous projection of 1.3%.

The leaders most ideologically compatible with Trump are under the heaviest domestic pressure to distance themselves from his war, because their voters are paying for it in energy bills and at the pump. The political logic that once made alignment with Washington attractive seems to have inverted.

In early March, an Iranian drone strike destroyed a US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) radar at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. To replace it, the Pentagon transferred THAAD components from Seongju, South Korea, to the Middle East, without public announcement, though footage of the convoy leaving Seongju circulated on South Korean social media within hours. All six THAAD launchers were removed from the base.

THAAD is the upper tier of South Korea's missile defence architecture, designed to intercept North Korean ballistic missiles at the highest altitudes before they reach populated areas. On March 14, the week the launchers left South Korea, North Korea conducted its third ballistic missile test of 2026.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung acknowledged the redeployment at a cabinet meeting, saying Seoul had expressed opposition but cannot have its position fully reflected in every case, while insisting the removal would not critically affect deterrence. South Korean defence analysts were less certain, noting that THAAD's absence leaves a gap at the upper interception layer that existing Patriot batteries are not designed to cover.

North Korea has conducted three ballistic missile tests since January. Nobody in Seoul or Washington has said publicly when the launchers are coming back.

The war between Sudan's national army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces entered its fourth year on April 15, making it by most measures the largest humanitarian crisis on earth and one of the least reported.

Nearly 34 million people, approximately 65% of Sudan's population, currently require humanitarian assistance according to the United Nations. Fourteen million have been displaced, estimates of the dead range from 150,000 to 400,000, and in the first three months of 2026 drone strikes killed or wounded at least 245 children, more than at any previous point in the war. The United Arab Emirates, a key US ally, has been widely accused by UN investigators of supplying the RSF paramilitary force.

The international response plan for 2026 requires $3 billion. A conference in Berlin on April 16 aimed to raise $1 billion of that and fell well short, in part because the Iran war has consumed the diplomatic attention and media space that Sudan's crisis would otherwise command.

The WHO's main humanitarian hub in Dubai, through which supplies for Sudan were routed, has been disrupted by the Iran conflict, and World Food Programme assistance to Sudan fell 14% in the first months of this year due to financing shortfalls. Trump administration cuts to USAID have reduced US humanitarian contributions at precisely the moment the response plan needs them most.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio called in November 2025 for international pressure on countries supplying the RSF, a reasonable diplomatic position that has not been backed by the funding required to give it any practical weight.

The number: $4.05

The current national average price of a gallon of gasoline in the United States, according to figures cited by Energy Secretary Chris Wright on Monday.

Before the Iran conflict began disrupting Strait of Hormuz traffic, analysts had projected US gas prices holding in the $3.20 to $3.40 range through summer 2026.

The gap between that projection and today's figure is a direct consequence of two months of contested maritime traffic through one of the world's most strategically significant waterways.

Iran's chief negotiator Mohammad Ghalibaf said this morning that over the past two weeks Iran has been "preparing new cards on the battlefield," without specifying what those cards are.

He made the statement in a post on X criticising Trump for "imposing a siege."

The deliberate vagueness was almost certainly calculated: on the morning before a ceasefire expires, an unspecified threat carries more weight than a specific one.